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ABSTRACT 
 
In this exploratory research, and driven by intense interest in media focused attention on the 
apparently wide differential in pay contrast between US top managers in large corporations  versus 
their non-US top managers, we examined the backgrounds of the highest paid Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) in the United States.  Specifically, we investigated the extent to which national 
origin, which we used as a proxy for cultural background, of CEOs affected salaries received, the 
way firms were managed and how firms performed.  The data for the study was derived from the 
Forbes 800 CEO compensation data. The data extended from 1991-1997 and included 4,834 
observations. Regressions were run to determine the extent to which the birthplace of the CEO 
affected the salary that the CEO received, along with the capital structure, dividend policy and 
return on assets of the firm.  The results indicated that CEOs with differing nationalities were 
compensated differently, and operated their firms differently than U.S. born CEOs.  The 
compensation of the CEOs was found to be higher for some groups of foreign born CEOs.  Some 
evidence of differing capital structures was found. However, the results were not significant after 
incorporating the full set of control variables into the regressions.  CEOs from Central and South 
America paid out larger percentages of firm earnings to owners in the form of dividends than other 
CEOs.  Finally, the study found some evidence to suggest that Central and South America born 
CEOs, and Australian and New Zealand born CEOs earned a higher return on assets than other 
CEOs. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
necdotally, at the very least, United States (US) Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are alleged to receive 
excessive compensation relative to CEOs outside the US.  One argument put forth for the pay 
differential has to do with cultural differences.  However, is this true, and is it warranted?  Do cultural 
differences lead to different performances among CEOs?  These are questions that this research examines in an 
exploratory way using a novel set of data. 
 
CEO compensation and firm performance have long provided fodder for the press.  Appearing both in 
business magazines and in academic journals, these articles tend to focus on questions such as how much pay CEOs 
receive; do they provide performance commensurate with their pay; what are the characteristics of their firms; and 
what are the backgrounds of the CEOs.  The study undertaken here analyzed those questions providing two unique 
aspects.  First, instead of a limited or anecdotal set of data points, this study utilized a large dataset that spanned 
several years.  Second, no known previous study has examined how the birthplace of the CEO interrelates with the 
operations and performance of the firm. 
 
Each year since 1973, Forbes Magazine has published a list containing information about the Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) of large United States Companies.  Specifically, Forbes examines compensation for 
A 
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approximately 800 Chief Executive Officers.  Forbes collects the data annually and presents it in a mid-year edition of 
the magazine.  The magazine identifies 800 CEOs each year associated with the Forbes 500 listing of largest 
companies which ranks firms by sales, profits, assets and stock market value.  The Forbes Compensation List contains 
background information about each CEO, the compensation of the CEO, as well as selected firm performance data.  
One variable included in this study’s dataset is the birthplace of the CEO which provided a primary focal point of the 
research.   
 
Issues such as how CEO birthplace interrelates with the compensation package of the CEO, the capital 
structure and dividend policy that the CEO will adopt, and the return that the firm provides to the stockholders, made 
up the goals of this study.  We found some evidence to suggest that the national origin of the CEO affected the salary 
that the CEO earned, as well as the manner in which the CEO operated the firm.  Specifically, differences existed in 
capital structure, dividend policy, and return on assets among CEOs with different birthplaces.   To examine these 
issues, we combined the Forbes data set with the Stock Investor Pro data set available from the American Association 
of Individual Investors.  That latter data set contains detailed financial information on firms.  The remainder of this 
paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we discuss the research objectives of this paper.  That section is 
followed by a discussion of the prior literature in this series of papers and the variables used in this study along with 
corresponding literature.  Next, the data utilized in the study is discussed quickly followed by the presentation of some 
summary statistics.  The hypotheses and test results are discussed in combination in the following section. The paper 
closes with some concluding comments and a discussion of the limitations of the study. 
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
In this paper we examine how CEO’s from different cultures, as proxied by their birthplace, differ from each 
other with regard to how they are compensated, how they manage their firms, and the return that they produce for 
their stockholders.  To the extent that cultural background affects the way individuals manage firms, a CEO with one, 
or another, cultural background might be most appropriate for a given firm. Thus, the managerial implications of this 
work hope to improve our understanding of the interaction between CEO cultural background, managerial decision 
making and the financial performance of the firm.  More specifically, we wish to document the extent to which CEO’s 
from various nationalities manage large U.S. firms differently.  We wish to determine differences in compensation 
based on the birthplace of the CEO after controlling for a number of demographic variables. We examine different 
managerial behaviors of CEO’s by examining the dividend policy of the firm and the capital structure of the firms that 
they manage.  CEO’s, along with their boards of directors, have direct influence over these two variables.  Evidence 
that individuals with different cultural backgrounds manage these important issues differently would suggest an 
optimal cultural background for the CEO.  Finally, we examine the returns that are provided to stockholders by CEO’s 
having differing cultural backgrounds. 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Prior Literature In This Research Stream 
 
A plethora of work exists examining demographic characteristics of firm CEOs and the performance of the 
firms they manage. One can dissect the literature review into two parts.  First, the authors discuss their own previous 
research on the topic.  Secondly, we briefly examine additional work, in conjunction with a discussion of the variables 
utilized in the paper.  The first paper in this series, by Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002) examined the relationships 
among compensation, firm performance, and the university where the CEO earned his/her degree(s).   The results 
indicated that CEOs of large firms generally came from a premier group of higher education institutions.  Jalbert, et 
al., (2002) found a significant relationship between the educational background of the CEO and the total 
compensation that the CEO earned after controlling for industry, firm size and other mitigating factors.  Interestingly, 
the results indicated that CEOs who did not have a degree earned more than those with a college degree.   Jalbert, et 
al., (2002) found little evidence of a relationship between school attended and CEO compensation.  The age of the 
CEO as well as the number of years that the individual had been the CEO were found to have a positive impact on 
CEO compensation.  That study also found a negative relationship between the number of years that the individual 
had been with the firm and the compensation that the CEO earned indicating that salary compression, a well known 
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phenomena in academia, also occurs at the highest levels of the corporate world.  Finally, possession of a degree as 
well as degree pedigree affected ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
Jalbert, Jalbert and Perrina (2004), examined the specific degrees earned by CEOs as they related to the ages 
when individuals started working for the firms, how long they worked for the firms before they became CEOs, the age 
when the individual became CEOs, the salaries individually earned as CEOs and other variables.  The results indicated 
that the total compensation earned as CEO depended upon the undergraduate and graduate degrees held by the 
individual. Those holding differing degrees were found to have earned their undergraduate and graduate degrees at 
different ages; had been with the firms for differing numbers of years; started working for the firms at different ages; 
became the CEO at differing ages; and were with the firms for differing amounts of time before becoming the CEO. 
 
Jalbert and Jalbert (2005), examined how founding CEOs differed from non-founding CEOs.  They identified 
significant differences between the total compensation received by founding and non-founding CEOs.  The 
compensation differentials varied based upon the undergraduate and graduate degrees held.  When comparing 
founders to non-founders, the study found significant differences in the ages of the CEOs, the ages when the 
individuals received their undergraduate and graduate degrees, the ages at which they started working for the firm, and 
the ages at which they became CEO.  Many non-founding CEOs started working for the firm that they ultimately 
managed in the year prior to earning their college degrees.  However, founding CEOs were more likely to finish their 
degrees before becoming the CEO of the firms they founded.   Few individuals earned either their undergraduate or 
graduate degrees after taking on the role of CEO. 
 
Variables 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
This section discusses each of the variables used in the analyses.  First the dependent variables are presented 
and discussed.  A discussion of the independent variables follows in the next subsection.  The first dependent variable 
was the total compensation provided by the firm to the CEO (TCOMP).  Forbes Magazine provided data on this 
variable.  We did not break down the variable into its subcomponents (stock options, base pay, benefits and so forth).  
In instances where the data appeared by component, we summed these components to arrive at the total compensation 
of the CEO.  Murphy (2003) and Murphy and Hall (2002), among others, have documented the importance of 
differentiating between the different components of compensation.  Unfortunately, the nature of the Forbes dataset did 
not permit such an analysis in this case.  While Forbes did break down the compensation into its components, it did 
not do so in a consistent fashion across years.  Thus when analyzing the data across multiple years, as this paper does, 
it is not appropriate to use the data components.  In this paper, notwithstanding the just noted limitation, we did at 
least extend the compensation literature by examining the effect of birthplace on total compensation. 
 
Long term debt to equity (LTDE) represented the second dependent variable.  We obtained data on the long 
term debt to equity ratio from Stock Investor Pro.  Modigliani and Miller (1958) wrote the seminal article on capital 
structure.  Since then, many articles have extended this line of literature including Modigliani and Miller (1963); 
Miller (1977); DeAngelo and Masulis (1980); and Jalbert (2002).  In general, this line of research has found mixed 
results concerning the extent to which an optimal capital structure exists and the extent to which it impacts the value 
of the firm.  One line of literature suggests that the structure of CEO compensation should be a function of firm risk, 
leverage, size, and growth opportunities of the firm (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; and Prendergast, 2002).  John and 
John (1993) found a negative relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and leverage.  In this paper, we extend 
the capital structure stream of literature by examining whether CEO birthplace is interrelated with the capital structure 
adopted by the firm.   
 
The dividend payout ratio of the firm (PAYOT) made up the third dependent variable.  We obtained data on 
the dividend payout ratio from Stock Investor Pro.  Like the capital structure literature, the dividend policy literature is 
voluminous.  Miller and Modigliani (1961) proposed an irrelevance theory suggesting that in an idealized world, 
dividends do not affect the value of the firm.  Many authors have extended this work, with some arguing the 
irrelevance of dividend policy to the value of the firm and others arguing the enhancement of firm value by following 
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a particular dividend policy.  Specifically, one series of literature focused on the roles of transaction costs in 
determining and optimal dividend policy (Bhide, 1993).  Other lines of research focus on the role of dividends in 
monitoring firm managers (Easterbrook, 1984).  Yet other research explores the information content of dividends 
(Lintner, 1956; Fama and Babiak, 1968 and Leland and Pyle, 1977).  In this paper, we extend this line of research by 
examining the extent to which the CEO birthplace affected firm dividend policies. 
 
Return on assets (ROA) of the firm constituted the final dependent variable.  A great deal of research has 
examined the relationship between CEO compensation and various performance measures such as ROA.  Jalbert, Rao 
and Jalbert (2002) found that founders provided a seven percent higher ROA on average than other CEOs.  
Fahlengrach (2005) confirmed this finding in that founder CEO’s achieved an 11% higher return to investors than 
non-founders. Thomas and Peyrefitte (1996) examined U.S. based multinational firms finding that leadership traits 
along with environmental and organizational factors affected performance of multinational firms.  Specific leadership 
traits identified included age, tenure with the company, position tenure, and education.  Older CEOs were found to 
have a positive impact on firm performance, after controlling for the affects of industry.  Position tenure was found to 
be negatively related to firm performance. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Next, the focus of the discussion turned to independent variables we incorporated into our analyses.  We 
primarily focused on how CEO birthplace related to each dependent variable identified above.  Data on the birthplace 
of the CEO was obtained from Forbes Magazine.   Kato and Rockel (1992) found significant differences between U.S. 
firm managers and Japanese firm managers indicating the impact that culture can have on managerial behavior.  
Wolfe Morrison, and Milliken (2004) described how the cultural background of a firms top management team can 
affect the behavior of the manager and the approach that the manager takes to operating a business.  In this paper, we 
examined how the cultural backgrounds of the CEOs affected the manner with which the firms were managed, the 
compensation that CEOs received, and the performance of the firms they managed.   
 
A second independent variable was the total assets of the firm (ASSETS).  The relationship between firm 
size and a variety of firm characteristics and performance issues are well established.  Identification of the size effect 
is generally attributed to Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981). The findings indicate that smaller New York Stock 
Exchange listed firms have higher risk adjusted returns than their larger counterparts.  Further, a number of papers 
documented the relationship between firm size and CEO compensation (see Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert, 2002; Gibbons 
and Murphy, 1992; Baker and Murphy, 1988).  Baker and Hall (2002) showed that the optimal CEO compensation 
packages depended upon firm size.  In this paper, we extend the literature by showing how the cultural background of 
the CEO interacted with the size of the firm and other variables to affect firm performance, capital structure, dividend 
policy and compensation.  
 
Another independent variable incorporated into the analysis was the percent of the firm owned by the CEO 
(POWN).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) wrote the seminal article on the relationship between the proportion of the 
firm owned by an employee and his/her motivations.   They argued that utility maximizing managers should be 
expected to act in their own best interests.  Moreover, managers’ best interests were not always consistent with the 
owners’ best interests.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that increasing the proportion of the firm owned by 
managers aligned the managers’ interests with those of the shareholders.  Fama (1980) on the other hand argued that a 
properly functioning labor market for managers served to minimize agency problems.   In this paper, we further 
examined the extent to which ownership structure affected CEO compensation, ROA, capital structure and dividend 
policy. 
 
We included a number of additional demographic variables related to the CEOs in the analysis. A substantial 
body of literature exists regarding the effects of varying CEO characteristics on the firm and how the firm is managed.  
Wiersema and Bantel (1992), established that demographic attributes of CEOs affected firm performance and the 
firm’s business decisions.  Variables found to have an effect included youth, tenure, educational level, and functional 
background.  To control for these effects, we incorporated a series of independent variables into the analysis.  The first 
demographic variable was the age of the CEO (AGE). A number of studies have documented the importance of CEO 
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age in determining compensation (Strober, 1990) as well as how the CEO manages the firm.  Lucier, Schuyt, and 
Spiegel (2003) found that individuals average 50 years of age when promoted to the CEO position.  Wesphal and 
Zajac (1995) found a negative relationship between CEO age and attitude toward risk.  A study by Stevens, Beyer & 
Trice (1978) indicated that younger, or less mature, CEOs were more aggressive than their elder counterparts.  
Specifically, that study found younger CEOs were more innovative and would seek out more risk and growth.   Berry, 
Bisjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2000) examined CEO turnover and firm diversification using Forbes 1991 data.  They 
found that average CEO age varied from 56.2 to 57.3 years.   
 
A second demographic variable was the number of years the individual had been with the firm (YRFRM).  
Barro and Barro (1990) found that the pay-performance sensitivity of bank CEOs diminished with CEO experience.  
Datta and Guthrie (1994) suggested that industry specific experience was essential for CEOs.  Kato and Rockel 
(1992b) completed a comparative study of Japanese versus U.S. firms.  They found that CEOs of Japanese firms 
tended to be more experienced than their US firm counterparts.  Specifically, they found that 60 percent of Japanese 
CEOs had 15 or more years of experience with the firm prior to appointment as the CEO, compared to 50 percent of 
U.S. firm CEOs.  In Japanese (U.S.) firms, the individual accepted the CEO position at age 56 (49).  Japanese CEOs 
had longer tenures (27 years) with their firms than their U.S. counterparts (20 years).  Brick, Palmon and Wald (2003) 
found that age has an insignificant role in explaining CEO compensation, but experience was positively related to 
compensation.  Closely related to the number of years the individual had been with the firm was the number of years 
that the individual had been the CEO (YRCEO).  The evidence suggested that CEO tenure was changing over time.  
Lucier, Schuyt, and Spiegel (2003) found a reduction of CEO tenure between 1995 and 2001 of 2.2 years.  Palia and 
Ravid (2002) found that, on average, CEOs stayed in office for 8.76 years.    Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) find that 
CEOs tended to leave their appointments at ages 64 and 65. 
 
A final demographic variable included in the analyses was a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO 
was the founder of the firm (FNDER).  Differences between firm founding CEOs and other CEOs are well 
established.  Fahlenbrach (2004) found that firms managed by a founder had higher capital expenditures, made more 
focused mergers and acquisitions, and provided positive abnormal returns to their investors.  Jalbert, Rao, and Jalbert 
(2002) and Jalbert and Jalbert (2005) also found a number of differences between founding CEOs and other CEOs.  
Most notably, they found that founding CEOs received higher levels of compensation, but also produced higher 
returns than other CEOs.  Others have argued that founders earn less than their non-founder counterparts, particularly 
when excluding stock returns from the analysis.  Some founders have even been known to take a token $1 in annual 
compensation (Plitch, 2005).  The findings in this paper extend the literature by examining the extent to which cultural 
background affects the identified differences between founders and non-founders.   
 
It is well known that firms in different industries operate differently and compensate their CEO’s differently.  
Roach and Goedde (2003) examined CEO compensation in the pharmaceutical industry.  A number of articles have 
examined compensation in the banking industry (see John, Saunders and Senbet, 2000; and Hermalin and Wallace, 
2001).  Barragato (2002) examined executive compensation in the hospital industry.  Each of these studies noted 
peculiarities of executive compensation based on industry.  Joskow, Rose and Wolfram (1996) show that political and 
regulatory constraints have an effect on CEO compensation in utilities industries.  It is also well established that firms 
in different industries have different dividend policies and capital structures as is noted by Hamada (1972), and Harris 
and Raviv (1991). Smith and Watts (1992) Gaver and Gaver (1993) and Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) provide 
discussions of dividend policy as it relates to industry.  To control for industry effects, the firms were classified by 
industry using two-digit SIC codes.  The data contained firms having twelve different two-digit SIC codes.  A dummy 
variable was created for each SIC code (IND1-IND12).   
 
Hypotheses Introduced 
 
To extend the lines of literature discussed here, we formulated four hypotheses.  First, the total compensation 
will be different for CEO’s with different birthplaces.  Second, the capital structure if the firm is determined in part by 
the birthplace of the CEO.  Third that the dividend policy of the firm is determined in part by the birthplace of the 
CEO and finally that the Return on Assets of the firm is determined in part by the birthplace of the CEO.  These 
hypotheses are fully developed and specified in the Hypotheses and Results section that appears later. 
Journal of Diversity Management – Second Quarter 2007                                                             Volume 2, Number 2 
 12 
DATA 
 
Forbes Magazine provided the Forbes CEO Compensation List from 1992-2003.  Data prior to 1992 was no 
longer available from Forbes Magazine in electronic format.  In order to complete the dataset, the authors created an 
electronic format of the Forbes 800 Compensation List from hard copies of the magazine for years prior to 1992.  The 
combined dataset contains 25,229 annual observations spanning the years 1972 to 2002.  The variables contained in 
the dataset vary by year.  Individual years contain as many as 30 variables.  Between the years 1975 and 1982 and 
again between the years 1986 and 1997, Forbes included variables in their dataset indicating individual birthplaces.  
Of interest in this study was how CEO birthplace related to other demographic variables associated with the CEO and 
the extent to which CEO birthplace affected the performance of the CEO.  As such, data limitations allowed only for 
the inclusion of 1975 through 1997, excluding 1983-1985.  While analysis of more recent data would have been 
optimal, such data was not available from Forbes Magazine or other sources. 
 
We obtained firm financial data from the American Association of Individual Investors through their Stock 
Investor Pro (SIP) product.  Annual data from SIP was available for the years between 1991 and 2002.  Analysis of 
the data prior to 1991 would have been optimal.  However, SIP data was not available to the authors prior to 1991.  
We merged the SIP data with the Forbes data for our analysis.  Thus the final data set contained data from 1991-1997 
and included 4,834 total annual observations, noting the congruent time periods of the Forbes and SIP data.   Further 
limiting the data, Forbes Magazine did not report the same variables each year.  For instance, the percentage of the 
firm owned by the CEO was available for the time period from 1991-1996.  As such, we reduced by one year those 
analyses incorporating this variable (e.g., did not include 1997).   
 
RESULTS – SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 
Table 1:  Birthplace By Country 
 
Birth Place Observations 
1975-1997 
Observations 
1991-1997 
Birth Place Observations 
1975-1997 
Observations 
1991-1997 
Panel A:  Country of Birth 
USA 16,032 4,494 Israel 23 0 
Argentina 5 0 Italy 37 9 
Australia 29 11 Japan 45 13 
Austria 10 1 Lebanon 8 7 
Belgium 6 3 Mexico 6 1 
Bulgaria 10 5 New Zealand 3 0 
Canada 150 75 Norway 2 0 
China 46 11 Palestine 4 0 
Czech Rep. 13 8 Pakistan 6 1 
Cuba 19 8 Peru 4 0 
Dutch East Indies 1 1 Poland 11 0 
Egypt 7 7 Russia 8 0 
England 119 40 Scotland 17 6 
Fiji 6 0 South Africa 15 6 
France 55 22 Sweden 4 3 
Germany 76 28 Taiwan 1 1 
Greece 17 7 The Netherlands 12 0 
Hong Kong 1 0 Trinidad 4 0 
Hungary 14 8 Turkey 11 0 
India 13 12 Venezuela 1 1 
Iran 3 3 Yugoslavia 8 6 
Ireland 17 7 Unknown 686 29 
Total Foreign Born 847 311 
Total Observations 17,565 4,834 
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Panel B:  By Region 
North America 16,182 4,569 Asia 107 38 
Central and South 
America 
39 10 Africa & Middle 
East 
77 24 
Australia and New 
Zealand 
38 11 Unknown 686 29 
Europe 436 153 
 
 
The analysis begins by presenting summary data of the CEO background.  Table 1, Panel A, provides data 
regarding the number of annual observations by CEOs from each country.  The first data column lists the entire data 
set, from 1975 through 1997, including 16,032 observations.  The second data column lists the reduced data set from 
1991-1997.  As expected, the preponderance of CEOs were born in the U.S.  The 1975-1997 data set shows 91.27 
percent (16,032/17,565 = 91.27%) of CEOs born in the U.S.  When analyzing the reduced data set, 92.97 percent 
(4,494/4,834) of CEOs were U.S. born.  The most common foreign origins included Canada, England, Germany and 
France.  The number of observations was limited for many countries.  To accommodate the analysis in light of these 
limited numbers, we organized the data into six regions and a category where the birthplace was unknown.  Panel B of 
Table 1 presents the resulting number of observations by region.  The regionally categorized data were utilized for all 
remaining analyses in the paper.   
 
Next, we examined the change in the number of foreign born CEOs by year.    Panel A of  Table 2 examines 
the full dataset from 1975 through 1997.  The data provided some evidence of an increase in the number of foreign 
born CEOs.  In 1975, the percentage of foreign born CEOs was 4.17 while in 1997 it was 6.77.  The number of 
foreign born CEOs reached a high in 1996 of 7.59 percent.  Panel B presents the reduced data set from 1991-1997.  
Again, there was some evidence to indicate an increasing number of foreign born CEOs.  The percentage of foreign 
born CEOs increased from 4.94 to 7.67 between 1991 and 1997.  However, the percentage dropped to 6.70 in 1997. 
 
 
Table 2:  Number Of Foreign CEOs By Year 
 
Year U.S. born Foreign 
Born 
Unknown Foreign 
Born % 
Year U.S. born Foreign 
Born 
Unknown Foreign 
Born % 
Panel A:  1975-1997, Full Dataset 
1975 781 34 4 4.17% 1986 753 35 8 4.44% 
1976 764 31 1 3.90% 1987 753 41 3 5.16% 
1977 758 33 2 4.17% 1988 751 45 2 5.65% 
1978 763 35 3 4.39% 1989 762 36 1 4.51% 
1979 764 32 3 4.02% 1990 755 41 2 5.15% 
1980 781 34 1 4.17% 1991 755 41 3 5.15% 
1981 762 32 3 4.03% 1992 750 45 3 5.66% 
1982 774 33 1 4.09% 1993 744 48 6 6.06% 
1983 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1994 745 47 6 5.93% 
1984 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1995 737 56 4 7.06% 
1985 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1996 731 60 6 7.59% 
     1997 730 53 10 6.77% 
Panel B:  1991-1997, Reduced Data 
1991 596 31 1 4.94 1994 623 41 5 6.17 
1992 605 37 2 5.76 1995 671 52 4 7.19 
1993 603 42 4 6.51 1996 686 57 4 7.67 
     1997 710 51 9 6.70 
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Table 3 provides summary statistics for the variables utilized in the analyses.  To analyze the data by 
birthplace, a dummy variable was created for each of the regions identified in Panel B of Table 1 resulting in a total of 
seven dummy variables.  The variable BP1=1 if the CEO was born in North America, 0 if elsewhere.  BP2=1 if the 
CEO was born in Central or South America; BP3=1 if the CEO was born in Australia or New Zealand; BP4=1 if the 
CEO was born in Europe; BP5=1 if the CEO was born in Asia; BP6= 1 if the CEO was born in Africa or the Middle 
East; and BP7=1 if the birthplace of the CEO was unknown.  The variables analyzed were POWN, AGE, ASSETS, 
ROA,  
 
 
Table 3:  Mean Variable Levels By CEO Birthplace 
 
 All Data BP1 BP2 BP3 BP4 BP5 BP6 BP7 
AGE 56.47 
6.63 
4834 
56.53 
6.62 
4569 
55.90 
9.10 
10 
56.55 
6.51 
153 
54.05 
6.58 
38 
55.21 
6.06 
24 
59.36 
3.75 
11 
51.34 
6.49 
29 
YRFRM 22.12 
12.38 
4832 
22.28 
12.36 
4568 
28.50 
15.95 
10 
21.52 
12.10 
153 
19.68 
10.44 
38 
16.13 
12.76 
24 
12.18 
9.04 
11 
9.89 
9.40 
28 
POWN 2.038 
5.802 
4044 
2.082 
5.88 
3833 
0.567 
0.300 
9 
0.980 
3.77 
127 
2.076 
2.642 
28 
0.238 
0.249 
19 
0.098 
0.077 
10 
3.879 
8.535 
18 
YRCEO 8.21 
8.07 
4834 
8.24 
8.10 
4569 
8.80 
6.37 
10 
8.33 
7.79 
153 
9.11 
8.00 
38 
3.71 
2.77 
24 
3.64 
1.80 
11 
6.00 
8.46 
29 
FNDER 0.0896 
0.286 
4812 
0.0868 
0.282 
4549 
0.1000 
0.316 
10 
0.1053 
0.308 
152 
0.316 
0.471 
38 
0.000 
0.000 
23 
0.000 
0.000 
11 
0.241 
0.435 
29 
ASSETS 13,370 
37,130 
4834 
13,352 
37,021 
4569 
8,671 
5,983 
10 
15,885 
44,917 
153 
16,426 
46,654 
38 
7,356 
7,134 
24 
22,769 
25,057 
11 
1,910 
1,618 
29 
PAYOT 43.56 
76.53 
4175 
44.17 
77.25 
3950 
54.00 
61.13 
10 
34.01 
72.84 
136 
19.92 
17.87 
33 
57.58 
56.61 
17 
47.96 
9.63 
9 
7.28 
12.59 
20 
ROA 4.55 
13.66 
4627 
4.49 
13.78 
4369 
11.71 
8.94 
10 
6.58 
6.45 
149 
4.28 
6.02 
38 
3.56 
6.85 
22 
8.91 
5.19 
11 
-0.56 
28.12 
28 
LTDE 72.99 
99.34 
4499 
73.85 
99.81 
4249 
18.83 
11.76 
10 
67.24 
110.48 
148 
32.30 
36.56 
37 
77.45 
73.94 
19 
58.80 
32.73 
11 
46.88 
44.85 
25 
TCOMP 3,194,648 
7,790,847 
4795 
3,085,024 
7,474,938 
4356 
8,760,000 
6,260,113 
10 
5,084,191 
12,429,706 
152 
4,010,368 
6,386,415 
38 
7,832,917 
2,0815,704 
24 
4,397,091 
4,030,650 
11 
3,146,792 
5,925,101 
24 
 
 
YRCEO, YRFRM, FNDER, PAYOT, LTDE, and TCOMP, each as defined earlier.  The first figure in each 
cell is the mean, the second figure is the standard deviation, and the third is the number of observations utilized in the 
computations.  The first column in Table 3 provides the statistics for the entire dataset.  The remaining columns 
analyze the data by the birthplace region of the CEO.  One can note large differences in the values of the variables 
based on birthplace.  Particularly noteworthy were large differences in the number of years with the firm, assets under 
management, dividend payout policy, amount of long term debt and CEO compensation.   
 
The analyses now turn to an examination of the extent to which the differences identified thus far explain the 
variance in important firm variables.  Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables 
utilized in the analyses.  The first figure in each cell is the Pearson correlation coefficient, the second is the p-value, 
and the third is the number of observations.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.  The results indicated that the null hypotheses of no correlation were rejected at the one percent level for 
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most of the variable combinations and at the 10 percent level for several other combinations.  In general the 
correlations were relatively low with only a few correlations exceeding 0.10.  The exceptions to this rule were as one 
might expect.  YRCEO was moderately correlated with CEOAGE, YRFRM, POWN and FNDER.  FNDER was 
moderately correlated with PAYOT, CEOAGE, POWN and YRCEO.  LTDE was moderately correlated with the 
ASSETS and ROA.   
 
 
Table 4:  Correlation Analysis 
 
 AGE YRFRM POWN YRCEO FNDER ASSETS PAYOT ROA LTDE 
YRFRM 0.420 
0.0001*** 
4832 
        
POWN 0.0407 
0.0096*** 
4044 
0.0655 
0.0001*** 
4042 
       
YRCEO 0.401 
0.0001*** 
4834 
0.385 
0.0001*** 
4832 
0.421 
0.0001*** 
4044 
      
FNDER 0.182 
0.2063 
4812 
0.0533 
0.0002*** 
4810 
0.442 
0.0001*** 
4022 
0.4633 
0.0001*** 
4834 
     
ASSETS 0.0220 
0.1268 
4834 
0.0721 
0.0001*** 
4832 
-0.083 
0.0001*** 
4044 
-0.0467 
0.0012*** 
4834 
-0.0817 
0.0001*** 
4159 
    
PAYOT 0.0438 
0.0046*** 
4175 
0.0700 
0.0001*** 
4173 
-0.106 
0.0001*** 
3481 
-0.069 
0.0001*** 
4175 
-0.1176 
0.0001*** 
4159 
-0.006 
0.678 
4175 
   
ROA -0.0145 
0.324 
4627 
0.0063 
0.6677 
4625 
0.0757 
0.0001*** 
3855 
0.0207 
0.159 
4627 
0.0254 
0.0845* 
4606 
-0.062 
0.0001*** 
4627 
-0.170 
0.0001*** 
4097 
  
LTDE 0.0193 
0.195 
4499 
-0.0003 
0.9821 
4497 
-0.049 
0.0024*** 
3759 
-0.073 
0.0001*** 
4499 
-0.072 
0.0001*** 
4478 
0.1932 
0.0001*** 
4499 
0.0633 
0.0001*** 
4021 
-0.229 
0.0001*** 
4498 
 
TCOMP 0.027 
0.063* 
4795 
-0.024 
0.094* 
4793 
0.028 
0.075* 
4036 
0.087 
0.0001*** 
4795 
0.083 
0.0001*** 
4773 
0.108 
0.0001*** 
4795 
-0.054 
0.0005*** 
4149 
0.0714 
0.0001*** 
4591 
-0.0001 
0.9956 
4466 
 
 
RESULTS – HYPOTHESES AND TESTING 
 
Harking back to the section “Hypotheses Introduced”, the analyses begin by examining how total 
compensation differed based on the birthplace of the CEO using regression analysis techniques.  We postulated the 
following null and alternative hypotheses.   
 
Ho1:  The Total Compensation of the CEO is not different for CEO’s of varying birthplaces 
Ha1:  The Total Compensation of the CEO will be different depending upon the Birthplace of the CEO 
 
To test this hypothesis, controlling for the effects of the independent variables noted above, the following 
regression was run.  Various versions of the regression were estimated including regressing each of the independent 
variables individually on the dependent variable, as well as running combinations of variables. 
 
TCOMP = α + β1(BP2) + β2(BP3) + β3(BP4) + β4(BP5)+ β5(BP6)+ β6(BP7)+ β7(POWN) + β8(AGE) + β9(ASSETS) + 
β10(ROA) + β11(YRCEO) + β12(YRFRM) + β13(FNDER) + β14-24(IND1-11) 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the tests of Hypothesis 1.  In each of the regressions in Table 5, the dependent 
variable was the total compensation of the CEO.  The first regression involved regressing the birthplace dummy 
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variables on the total compensation of the CEO.  The birthplace dummy variables were defined by region as noted 
earlier in the article.  We completed the regressions by leaving out the dummy variable associated with North 
American born CEOs.  The results clearly indicated differences in compensation based on the location of birth.  Two 
of the coefficients were positive and significant, indicating that the CEOs from these regions earned more than their 
North American born counterparts.   Specifically, CEOs from Central and South America, Asia and Australia and 
New Zealand earned substantially more than their U.S. counterparts.  Central and South American born CEOs earned 
on average in excess of $5 million more per year than their U.S. counterparts!   
 
The next series of regressions involved independently regressing each control variable, except the industry 
dummy variables, on total compensation.  In each of the single regressions, the control variable exhibited a significant 
impact on total compensation.  In the first regression, the percentage of the firm owned by the CEO was regressed on 
total compensation.  The results indicated that CEOs who owned larger portions of their firms received higher total 
compensation, with each percent of additional ownership resulting in $32,508 of additional compensation. AGE, 
ROA, YRCEO and YRFRM were all significantly positively related to compensation.  Founders earned $2,263,953 
more than their non-founder counterparts.  The coefficient on the assets variable of 22.69 indicated that managers 
earned $22.69 per year more for each million dollars under management.  While this might not seem like a large 
amount of money, it can become substantial.  For example, a manager of a firm with $300 billion of assets would 
receive a size based salary element of more than $6 million per year. 
 
To complete the analysis of compensation we combined the control variables, including industry variables, to 
determine the overall explanatory power.    The indicator “I” was set to 1 when the industry variables were 
incorporated into the regression but the parameters are not reported here. The results were similar to the individual 
regressions with two exceptions.  The variable for Asian born CEOs was no longer significant after the data was 
adjusted for the control variables.  In addition, the age of the CEO was no longer significant in explaining total 
compensation when the control variables were included in the regression.  In each regression in the analysis, the F-
value significantly differed from zero.  Unfortunately, these variables did not explain a great deal of the variation in 
total CEO compensation, as the largest R
2
 was only 0.0483.  From a managerial perspective, in light of the results 
presented here, compensation boards should be aware of the likely compensation differences that CEO’s with 
differing cultural backgrounds might expect. 
 
In the next analysis, we examined if the birthplace of the CEO affected the capital structure that the firm 
would ultimately adopt.   
 
Ho2:  The Capital Structure is not affected by the birthplace of the CEO. 
Ha2:  The Capital Structure is determined in part by the birthplace of the CEO. 
 
To test the hypotheses, we regressed a number of independent variables on the long term debt to equity ratios 
of the firms. The regression is formulated in a manner similar to the previous regression equation as follows.  Again, 
various versions of the regression were run including regressing each of the independent variables individually on the 
dependent variable, as well as running combinations of variables. 
 
LTDE = α + β1(BP2) + β2(BP3) + β3(BP4) + β4(BP5)+ β5(BP6)+ β6(BP7)+ β7(POWN) + β8(AGE) + β9(ASSETS) + 
β10(ROA) + β11(YRCEO) + β12(YRFRM) + β13(FNDER) + β14-24(IND1-11) 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the test of Hypothesis 2.  Interestingly, European and Central and South 
American born CEOs were found to use less debt in their capital structures than U.S. born CEOs.  However, these 
results did not hold once the control variables were included in the regressions.  Thus the overall evidence would seem 
to suggest that capital structure is not driven by the cultural background of the CEO. 
 
While the birthplace of the CEO was the primary variable of interest in this paper, the results of the tests on 
the control variables provided considerable insight.  The asset level of the firm had a positive impact on the amount of 
debt that the firm used.  POWN, ROA, YRCEO each had a negative impact on the amount of debt that the firm used.  
Interestingly, firm founders were found to use substantially less debt, 25 percent of the capital structure, than their 
Journal of Diversity Management – Second Quarter 2007                                                             Volume 2, Number 2 
 17 
non-founding counterparts.   It is important to note that possibly the founder variable was serving as a proxy variable 
for the age of the firm.  On average, one would expect that firms having a founder CEO would be younger than firms 
having a non-founder CEO.   
 
If this is the case, the results here may be an indication that the capital structure of the firm was a function of 
the age of the firm rather than of type of CEO (founder vs. non-founder).  Unfortunately, data on firm age was not 
available for this study. 
 
The analysis continues by examining the dividend payout ratio of the firm.  Dividend policy has long been an 
issue in the literature as noted earlier.  In this section, we examine the extent to which the dividend payout ratio of the 
firm varied by the birthplace of the CEO.  We forwarded the following hypotheses: 
 
Ho3:  The dividend payout ratio is not affected by the birthplace of the CEO. 
Ha3:  The dividend payout ratio is determined in part by the birthplace of the CEO. 
 
To test the hypotheses, we regressed a number of independent variables on the dividend payout ratio of the 
firm.  The regression, run in various versions is formulated in a manner similar to the previous regression regressions 
as follows   
 
DPO = α + β1(BP2) + β2(BP3) + β3(BP4) + β4(BP5)+ β5(BP6)+ β6(BP7)+ β7(POWN) + β8(AGE) + β9(ASSETS) + 
β10(ROA) + β11(YRCEO) + β12(YRFRM) + β13(FNDER) + β14-24(IND1-11) 
 
The results of the test of Hypothesis 3, presented in Table 7, were mixed.  When not including the control 
variables in the regression, European born CEOs and those with an unknown birthplace were found to have lower 
dividend payout ratios than U.S. born CEOs.  When the control variables were included in the regression, the results 
were substantially different.  In the full regression, incorporating all control variables, Central and South American 
CEOs had significantly higher payout ratios.  The control variables were also of interest.  The signs of the regression 
coefficients indicated a negative relationship between the dividend payout ratio (the dependent variable) and several 
of the independent variables (percent ownership by the CEO, ROA, YRCEO, and FOUNDER).  These results held in 
both the single and multiple regressions.  A positive relationship was found between the AGE and the payout ratio 
when unadjusted for the control variables.  This relationship was no longer significant after including control variables 
in the regression.  A positive relationship existed between the YRFRM and the payout ratio both in the single 
regression and when including the control variables in the regression.  Boards of Directors should be aware of the pre-
disposition of individuals from certain backgrounds to adopt a certain dividend policy, particularly if such a policy is 
not consistent with the Board of Directors’ preferred strategy. 
 
Finally, we examined the return on assets provided by managers of differing national origins.  We postulated 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Ho4:  The return on assets of the firm is not affected by the birthplace of the CEO. 
Ha4:  The return on assets of the firm is determined in part by the birthplace of the CEO. 
 
To test the hypotheses, we regressed a number of independent variables on the return on assets of the firm.  
The regression, run in various versions is formulated in a manner similar to the previous regression regressions as 
follows   
 
ROA = α + β1(BP2) + β2(BP3) + β3(BP4) + β4(BP5)+ β5(BP6)+ β6(BP7)+ β7(POWN) + β8(AGE) + β9(ASSETS) + 
β10(ROA) + β11(YRCEO) + β12(YRFRM) + β13(FNDER) + β14-24(IND1-11) 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the Hypotheses 4 tests.  The first series of regressions involved regressing the 
control variables on the ROA of the firm.  The return on assets was positively explained by the percentage ownership 
by the CEO, and the founder variable.  These findings indicated that the higher the level of ownership by the CEO, the 
higher the return on assets that the firm earned.  Founders earned a higher return for their firms than non-founder 
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CEOs.   The dollars of assets under management and the dividend payout ratio were negatively related to the return on 
assets of the firm.  The CEO age, or years as the CEO, were not significant in explaining ROA.  Next, a multiple 
regression was run with mixed findings.  Central and South American born CEOs earned a higher return on assets 
than their U.S. born counterparts.  Those with a birth place classified as “other” produced a lower ROA than other 
CEOs.  Finally, we regressed both the birthplace variables and the control variables, including the industry control 
variables, on the ROA of the firm.  The first regression included the percentage ownership of the CEO and the 
dividend payout ratio.  The second regression eliminated these two variables.  In the first of these regressions, the only 
birthplace variable that remained significant was the Central and South American CEOs.  The control variables were 
found to generally yield the same significant results as in the simple regressions.  When the percent ownership and 
payout variables were incorporated into the regression, the only birthplace variable that remained significant was the 
unknown birthplace variable.  Thus, from a managerial perspective, the evidence presented here suggests that Boards 
of Directors’ need not be overly concerned about hiring a manager from a certain background in an effort to produce 
higher returns for investors. 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
In this paper we examined the ways in which the birthplace of CEOs interrelated with the operations of firms.  
Specifically, we examined how the compensation of the CEO, the capital structure of the firm, the dividend policy of 
the firm, and the return on assets of the firm differed based on CEO birthplace.  We controlled for a number of 
variables including the percentage of the firm owned by the CEO, the age of the CEO, the dollars of assets under 
management, the dividend payout ratio, the years that the individual had been with the firm, the years that the 
individual had been the CEO of the firm, whether the individual was the founder of the firm, the size of the firm, and 
the industry in which the firm operated.  The evidence indicated that the birthplace of the CEO was related to 
differences in these variables.  The compensation of the CEO was found to be higher for some groups of foreign born 
CEOs.  Some evidence of differing capital structures was present, but the results were not significant when the full set 
of control variables were incorporated into the regressions.  
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Table 5:  Dependent Variable Total Compensation 
 
Intercept/N BP2 BP3 BP4 PB5 BP6 BP7 POWN AGE ASSETS ROA YRCEO YRFRM FNDER I F/R2 
3,085,024 
4795 
5,674,976 
2.31** 
1,999,167 
3.12*** 
925,344 
0.73 
4,747,893 
2.98*** 
1.312,067 
0.56 
61,768 
0.04 
       0 4.04*** 
0.005 
2,784,771 
4036 
      32,508 
1.78* 
      0 3.17* 
0.0008 
1,408,010 
4795 
       31,616 
1.86* 
     0 3.46* 
0.0007 
2890314 
4795 
        22.63 
7.54*** 
    0 56.87*** 
0.0117 
2997833 
4591 
         40385 
4.85*** 
   0 23.51*** 
0.0051 
2500473 
4795 
          83955 
6.05*** 
  0 36.56*** 
0.0076 
3533090 
4793 
           -15321 
-1.68* 
 0 2.81* 
0.0006 
2994889 
4773 
            2,263,953 
5.75*** 
0 33.06*** 
0.0069 
334891 
3824 
5290889 
2.51** 
1723956 
2.98*** 
459753 
0.38 
1452144 
0.92 
-708460 
-0.35 
-91731 
0.06 
-37841 
-1.79* 
15297 
0.83 
22.81 
7.08*** 
44982 
4.44*** 
88404 
5.05*** 
-42278 
-4.35*** 
776195 
1.73* 
1 8.07*** 
0.0485 
1123068 
3824 
5264820 
2.50** 
1727562 
2.98*** 
442612 
0.37 
1467490 
0.93 
-657285 
-0.33 
-90491 
-0.06 
-39358 
-1.87* 
 -40202 
-4.28*** 
44705 
4.42*** 
93555 
5.71*** 
-40202 
-4.28*** 
742128 
1.66* 
1 8.39*** 
0.0483 
 
Table 6:  Dependent Variable Long Term Debt to Equity 
 
Intercept/N BP2 BP3 BP4 PB5 BP6 BP7 POWN AGE ASSETS ROA YRCEO YRFR
M 
FNDER I F/R2 
73.85 
4499 
-55.01 
-1.75* 
-6.61 
-0.80 
-41.55 
-2.53** 
3.60 
0.16 
-15.05 
-0.50 
-26.97 
-1.35 
       0 2.00* 
0.0027 
74.37 
3759 
      -0.842 
3.03*** 
      0 9.20 
0.0024 
56.71 
4499 
       0.28822 
1.30 
     0 1.68 
0.0004 
65.78 
4499 
        0.0005 
12.21*** 
    0 174.38*** 
0.0373 
86.42 
4498 
         -2.74 
-15.76*** 
   0 248.32*** 
0.0523 
80.47 
4499 
          -0.899 
-4.93*** 
  0 24.31*** 
0.0054 
73.06 
4497 
           -0.0027 
-0.02 
 0 0.00 
0.000 
75.12 
4478 
            -25.08 
-4.83*** 
0 23.37*** 
0.0052 
133.09 
3735 
-38.88 
-1.27 
4.92 
0.58 
-16.17 
-0.93 
11.29 
0.46 
-35.54 
-1.21 
-9.16 
-0.39 
0.603 
2.01** 
-0.242 
-0.90 
0.0007 
14.20*** 
-2.77 
-13.71*** 
-0.311 
-1.22 
-0.133 
-0.93 
1.20 
0.18 
1 28.87*** 
0.1574 
BP1=1 if Birthplace = North America, 0 otherwise, BP2=1 if Birthplace = Central and South America, 0 otherwise, BP3=1 if Birthplace = Australia or New Zealand, 0 otherwise, BP4 = 1 if Birthplace = 
Europe, 0 otherwise, BP5 = 1 if Birthplace = Asia, 0 otherwise, BP6 = 1 if Birthplace = Africa and Middle East, 0 otherwise, BP7 = 1 if the Birthplace is unknown, 0 otherwise 
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Table 7:  Dependent Variable Dividend Payout Ratio 
 
Intercept/N BP2 BP3 BP4 PB5 BP6 BP7 POWN AGE ASSETS ROA YRCEO YRFRM FNDER I F/R2 
44.17 
4175 
9.82 
0.41 
-10.16 
-1.52 
-24.26 
-1.81* 
13.40 
0.72 
3.78 
0.15 
-36.89 
-2.15** 
       0 1.80* 
0.0026 
48.37 
3481 
      -1.47 
-6.29*** 
      0 39.56*** 
0.0112 
14.87 
4175 
       0.508 
2.83*** 
     0 8.02*** 
0.0019 
43.74 
4175 
        -0.00001 
-0.42 
    0 0.17 
0.000 
55.22 
4097 
         -1.79 
-11.01*** 
   0 121.29*** 
0.0288 
49.04 
4175 
          -0.651 
-4.50*** 
  0 20.22*** 
0.0048 
33.72 
4173 
           0.44 
4.53*** 
 0 20.55*** 
0.0049 
46.48 
4159 
            -31.21 
-7.64*** 
0 58.31*** 
0.0138 
77.57 
4079 
16.35 
0.70 
-0.80 
-0.12 
-7.50 
-0.58 
6.49 
0.35 
6.11 
0.24 
-21.67 
-1.27 
 0.074 
0.35 
-0.00004 
-1.26 
-1.74 
-10.04*** 
-0.46 
-2.42** 
0.454 
4.10*** 
-14.17 
-2.96*** 
1 15.39*** 
0.0804 
74.82 
3933 
20.06 
5.63**
* 
-0.151 
-0.02 
-8.24 
-0.53 
-0.423 
0.02 
6.957 
0.25 
-13.774 
-0.61 
-0.479 
-1.77* 
0.0968 
0.40 
-0.00005 
-1.28 
-1.83 
-8.95*** 
-0.411 
-1.82* 
0.5089 
3.95*** 
-11.11 
-1.93* 
1 14.24*** 
0.0921 
 
Table 8:  Dependent Variable Return On Assets 
 
Intercept/N BP2 BP3 BP4 PB5 BP6 BP7 POWN AGE ASSETS PAYOT YRCEO YRFRM FNDER I F/R2 
4.49 
4627 
7.22 
1.67* 
2.09 
1.84* 
-0.211 
-0.09 
-0.933 
-0.32 
4.42 
1.07 
-5.05 
-1.95* 
       0 1.88* 
0.0024 
4.35 
3855 
      0.0133 
4.711*** 
      0 22.20*** 
0.0057 
6.24 
4627 
       -0.0299 
-0.99 
     0 0.97 
0.0002 
4.860 
4627 
        -0.00002 
-4.20*** 
    0 17.60*** 
0.0038 
6.83 
4097 
         -0.016 
-11.01*** 
   0 121.29*** 
0.0288 
4.26 
4627 
          0.035 
1.41 
  0 1.99 
0.0004 
4.39 
4625 
           0.007 
0.43 
 0 0.018 
0.0000 
4.45 
4606 
            1.23 
1.73* 
0 2.98* 
0.0006 
6.70 
3393 
4.95 
2.29** 
0.32 
0.52 
0.22 
0.17 
-0.43 
-0.24 
2.54 
1.10 
2.38 
1.28 
0.077 
3.42*** 
-0.033 
-1.63 
-0.00002 
-4.96*** 
-0.01 
-8.95*** 
-0.015 
-0.79 
-0.003 
-0.27 
0.51 
1.07 
1 35.70*** 
0.2028 
5.74 
4604 
4.36 
1.01 
0.99 
0.88 
0.64 
0.29 
-1.48 
-0.50 
1.47 
0.35 
-5.96 
-2.27** 
 -0.055 
-1.53 
-0.00001 
-1.96** 
 0.047 
1.43 
0.019 
1.04 
-0.39 
-0.47 
1 6.99*** 
0.0325 
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CEOs from Central and South America paid out a larger percentage of firm earnings to owners than other 
CEOs.  Finally, there was some evidence to suggest that Central and South America Born CEOs, and Australian and 
New Zealand born CEOs earned a higher return than other CEOs. 
 
 In general, the evidence presented here suggests that CEO’s from differing cultural backgrounds might be 
expected to negotiate different compensation packages for themselves.  Compensation Boards should be award of 
these cultural differences.  Moreover, boards of directors should be aware that CEO’s with different birthplaces are 
likely to favor different dividend policies.  Boards of directors, and Chief Financial Officers should be aware of these 
tendencies in CEO’s.  Finally, boards of directors should be aware that CEO’s from different cultural backgrounds 
may produce higher returns, and quite possibly higher risk, than others.  These tendencies might be an important 
consideration when hiring a CEO. 
 
With regard to the large number of appalled commentators who view the compensation of U.S. CEO’s to be 
too high, the evidence here suggests that the U.S. cultural is not the driving force behind very large compensation 
packages.  Indeed, the evidence here suggests that individuals born in other countries frequently earn more as the 
manager of a large U.S. company than their U.S. born counterparts.  This line of literature might be extended with an 
examination of the compensation of U.S. born CEO’s that manage firms overseas. 
 
This paper extends the literature on a number of fronts.  First, we extend the CEO compensation literature 
with the finding that CEOs with different birthplaces are compensated differently.  Second, this study extends the 
capital structure and dividend policy lines of literature with the finding that CEOs with different birth places adopt 
different capital structures and have different dividend policies.  Finally, the analysis extends the CEO performance 
literature with the finding that CEOs with varying birthplaces provide different returns to stockholders.  Overall, the 
findings suggest there may exist a clientele effect with regard to managers, where managers with various cultural 
backgrounds can be expected to operate their firms differently.  Given the findings of this study, additional research 
into the effects of CEO birthplace on firm management and performance is warranted.  Such future work could 
resolve some of the limitations inherent in our analyses, or extend the work to analyze issues we did not explore in 
this paper. 
 
This study is subject to several limitations.  First, due to data limitations the birthplace was grouped by 
region.  More precisely classifying the birthplace of the CEO may provide additional insights.  In order to complete 
such an analysis, more data observations for each country of interest would be required.  A second limitation of the 
study was that the birthplace of the CEO provided only the location of an individual at a specific point in time.   The 
analyses here did not control for the amount of time the individual lived in the country of birth.  It can be reasonably 
expected that an individual who leaves his/her country of birth in the first three months of his life would be less 
affected by the culture of the birth country than an individual who lives in his/her country of birth for 30 or 40 years.  
We could not examine this issue in this paper because only data on the birthplace was available.  While this research 
is subject to several limitations, it provides a positive contribution toward understanding how CEO birthplace affects 
their compensation, as well as the way these CEOs may manage their firms.   
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Aggarwal, R. and A. Samwisk. 1999. The Other Side of the Trade-Off:  The Impact of Risk on Executive 
Compensation. Journal of Political Economy. v. 107, 65-105. 
2. Baker, G. and B. Hall. 2002. CEO Incentives and Firm Size.  NBER working Paper. No. 6868. 
3. Baker, M., G. Jensen, and K.J. Murphy. 1988. Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory. Journal of 
Finance. v. 43(3) 593-616. 
4. Banz, R. 1981. The Relationship Between Return and Market Value of Common Stocks. Journal of 
Financial Economics. v. 9(March), 3-18. 
5. Barclay, M.J. and C.W. Smith, Jr. 1995. The Determinants of Corporate Leverage and Dividend Policies. 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. Vol. 17 (Winter) P. 4-19. 
Journal of Diversity Management – Second Quarter 2007                                                             Volume 2, Number 2 
 22 
6. Barragato, C. 2002. Linking For-Profit and Nonprofit Executive Compensation:  Salary Composition and 
Incentive Structures in the U.S. Hospitality Industry. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit 
Organizations. V. 13 (3, September) 301-311. 
7. Barro, J.R. and R.J. Barro. 1990. Pay, Performance and Turnover of Bank CEOs. Journal of Labor 
Economic. v. 8, 448-481. 
8. Berry, T., J. Bizjak, M. Lemmon, and L. Naveen. 2000. CEO Turnover and Firm Diversification. v. 22 
(March). Social Science Research Network Electronic Library.  http://ssrn.com/219934, 9. 
9. Bhide, A. 1993. The Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity. Journal of Financial Economics. v. 
34(August), 31-51. 
10. Brick, I., O. Palmon, and J. Wald. 2003. CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm  
Performance: Evidence of Cronyism. Working Paper. 
11. Conte, M. and D. Kruse. 1991. ESOP’s and Profit Sharing Plans:  Do They Link Employee Pay Company 
Performance? Financial Management. v. 20, 91-100. 
12. Datta K. and J. Guthrie. 1994. Executive Succession:  Organizational Antecedents of CEO Characteristics. 
Strategic Management Journal. v. 15(7), 569-77. 
13. DeAngelo, H. and R. Masulis. 1980. Optimal Capital Structure Under Corporate and Personal Taxation. The 
Journal of Financial Economics. March, 3-30. 
14. Easterbrook, F. 1984. Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends. American Economic Review. v. 74 
(September), 650-59.  
15. Fahlengrach, R. 2004. Founder-CEOs And Stock Market Performance. Job Market Paper. 
16. Fahlengrach, R. 2005. Founder-CEOs and Stock Market Performance. The Ohio State University. Working 
Paper. July 27, 2005 version, 1-61  
17. Fama, E. and H. Babiak. 1968. Dividend Policy:  An Empirical Analysis. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association. v. 63 (Dec.) p. 1132-61. 
18. Fama, E.G. 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy. 88 (April) 
288-307. 
19. Forbes Magazine Forbes Compensation 800 List.  Forbes Magazine. May Issues. 1988-1997. 
20. Gaver J.J and K.M. Gaver. 1993. Additional Evidence on the Association Between the Investment 
Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend and Compensation Policies  Journal of Accounting and 
Economics vol. 16 (January/April/July 1993) p. 125-160. 
21. Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy. 1992. Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns:  
Theory and Evidence. Journal of Political Economy. v. 100(3) p. 468-505. 
22. Hamada, R.S. 1972. The Effect of the Firm’s Capital Structure on the Systematic Risk of Common Stocks, 
Journal of Finance vol. 27(May) p. 435-452. 
23. Harris M. and A. Raviv. 1991. The Theory of Capital Structure. Journal of Finance, vol. 46 (March) p. 297-
355.  
24. Hermalin, B.E. and N.E. Wallace. 2001. Firm Performance and Executive Compensation in the Loan 
Industry. Journal of Financial Economics. v. 36, 405-31. 
25. Jalbert, T.  2002. Pass-Through Taxation and the Value of the Firm. The American Business Review. V. 20(2) 47-54. 
26. Jalbert, T. and M. Jalbert. 2005. Founders versus non-founders: An Empirical Analysis of CEO Educational 
Background. Review of Business Research. v. 5(1), 87-100. 
27. Jalbert, T., M. Jalbert, and G. Perrina. 2004. Does Degree Matter?  An Empirical Analysis of CEO Educational 
Paths. Journal of College Teaching and Learning. v. 5(1) 65-73.  
28. Jalbert, T., R. Rao, and M. Jalbert. 2002. Does School Matter? An Empirical Analysis of CEO Education, 
Compensation and Firm Performance. Intl. Bus. & Econ. Research Journal. v. 1(1) 83-98. 
29. Jensen, M. and W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital 
Structure. Journal of Financial Economics. 3, 305-60. 
30. John, K., A. Saunders, and L. Senbet. 2000. A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation. 
Review of Financial Studies. v. 13, 95-125. 
31. John, T.A. and K. John. 1993. Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure. Journal of Finance. v. 
48, 949-74. 
Journal of Diversity Management – Second Quarter 2007                                                             Volume 2, Number 2 
 23 
32. Joskow, Paul L., Nancy L. Rose, and Catherine D. Wolfram (1996) Political Constraints on Executive. 
Compensation:  Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry, RAND Journal of Economics vol. 27(1, spring) 
p. 165-182.  
33. Kato, T. and M. Rockel. 1992. Experiences, credentials and compensation in the Japanese and U.S. 
managerial labor markets: evidence from new micro data. Journal of Japanese and International Economies. 
v. 6, 30-51. 
34. Kato, T. and M. Rockel. 1992b. The Importance of Company Breeding in the U.S and Japanese Managerial 
Labor Markets: A Statistical Comparison. Japan and The World Economy. v. 4, 39-45. 
35. Leland, H. and D. Pyle. 1977. Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial Intermediation. 
Journal of Finance. v. 32(May) p. 371-87.  
36. Lintner, J. 1956. Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Regained Earnings, and Taxes. 
American Economic Review. v. 46(May) 97-113. 
37. Lucier, C., R. Schuyt, and R. Spiegel. 2003. Performance-Related Dismissals Are Up and Board Tolerance is 
Down at Large Companies Around The World: the Annual Booz Allen Hamilton Study. Strategy & Business 
Magazine. May. 
38. Miller, M. 1977. Debt and Taxes. Journal of Finance. May, 261-75. 
39. Miller, M. and F. Modigliani. 1961. Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares. Journal of Business. 
v. 34(October) 411-33. 
40. Modigliani, F. and M. Miller. 1963. Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital. American Economic 
Review. June, 433-43. 
41. Modigliani, F. and M. Miller. 1958. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment. 
American Economic Review. June, 261-97. 
42. Murphy, K. 2003. Stock-Based Pay in New Economy Firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, v. 34, 
129-47. 
43. Murphy, K. and B. Hall. 2002. Stock Options for Undiversified Executives. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics. v. 33(1, February), 3-42. 
44. Murphy, K. and J. Zimmerman. 1993. Financial Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics. v. 16, 273-315. 
45. Palia, D. and A. Ravid. 2002. The Role of Founders in Large Companies: Entrenchment or Valuable  Human 
Capital? Working Paper. 
46. Plitch, P. 2005. Founder’s Fee. The Wall Street Journal. April 11, p. R4. 
47. Prendergast, C. 2002. The Tenuous Trade-off Between Risk and Incentives. Journal of Political Economy. v. 
110, 1071-1102. 
48. Reinganum, M. 1981. Misspecification of Capital Asset Pricing: Empirical Anomalies Based on Earnings 
Yields and Market Values. Journal of Financial Economics. v. 9 (March) 19-46. 
49. Roach, G. and A. Goedde. 2003. CEO Compensation in the Pharmaceutical Industry. Compensation Benefits 
Review. v. 35, 66-81. 
50. Smith, C.W. Jr. and R.L. Watts (1992). The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend 
and Compensation Policies Journal of Financial Economics vol. 32 (October) p. 263-292.  
51. Stevens, J., J. Beyer, and H. Trice. 1978. Assessing Personal Role, and Organizational Predictors of 
Managerial Commitment. Academy of Management Journal. v. 18, 74-81. 
52. Strober, M. 1990. Human Capital Theory:  Implications for HR Managers. Industrial Relations. v. 29, 214-
40. 
53. Thomas, S. and J. Peyrefitte. 1996. The Impact of Managerial Discretion on Firm Performance. Journal of 
Business Strategies. 13(1): 21-41. 
54. Wesphal, D. and E. Zajac. 1995. Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power Demographic Similarity and New 
Director Selection. Administrative Science Quarterly. v. 40(1) 60-83. 
55. Wiersema, M.  and K. Bantel. 1992. Top Management Team Demography and Corporate Strategic Change. 
Academy of Management Journal. 35: 91-121. 
56. Wolfe Morrison, E. and F. J. Milliken. 2004. Sounds of Silence. Sternbusiness, Sp./Su. 
 
 
 
Journal of Diversity Management – Second Quarter 2007                                                             Volume 2, Number 2 
 24 
NOTES 
 
